TRUMP'S WARS
We, Europeans, tend to analyze world events through the lens of the continent that dominated the world for centuries, shaping modern states and diplomatic relations. For example, we Europeans criticize the Monroe Doctrine, created to protect American democracies from the consequences of the return to absolutism in Europe, which became evident at the Congress of Vienna. Many years later, another great American president, Teddy Roosevelt, reaffirmed American anger when we Europeans sent warships to Venezuela for defaulting on its debt to European banks, because that's how we operated. These same Europeans didn't hesitate to wage war in Egypt when it nationalized the Suez Canal or to seize control of China when it tried to cancel concessions to Europeans. In short, we Europeans are now complaining about what we practiced for centuries. Our argument is that the world has become more civilized, while those negatively impacted ones believe it's about maintaining a status quo created when two-thirds of the world was under European control. Needless to say, no international or humanitarian law was respected by the Europeans when their interests were affected.
Trump's foreign policy is far more the product of a more measured analysis and the dizzying changes that have occurred throughout the 21st century than his outbursts suggest. The American giant has several structural problems that threaten its global leadership—political, economic, and military—. Donald Trump intends to reverse, or at least slow down, this process, and to do so he needs to be aggressive because his needs cannot be met with the tools defined in 1945 when the world was divided into two blocs: one, ours, which possessed or controlled 90% of the wealth, and the other only 10%, and when the international order was defined to maintain the status quo. Trump's vision of China is clear: without moral or legal constraints, using force and corruption to impose its model on the world, Beijing is an unbeatable competitor. The world of Western lawyers is bowing to that of Chinese engineers.
In reality, Donald Trump and his MAGA movement face six simultaneous wars, the outcome of which will determine the future of the country and its position in the world, and surely the future of humanity.
The first war , given the current state of events, is the oil war , and it has two aspects: ensuring the energy independence that Obama promised in 2008, which has produced extraordinary but insufficient results and comes with enormous risks; and reducing access to oil for its main strategic enemy, which is China, and it is in this aspect that we must understand the interventions in Iran and Venezuela.
Despite being the world's largest oil producer , the United States still needs to import a quantity second only to China. Nearly two-thirds of US oil consumption comes from fracking and the Canadian oil sands, not from traditional Texas wells. In 2026, the US will consume 20.61 million barrels per day, 70% of which is destined for transportation. Its production in 2025 reached a record 13.61 million barrels, meaning it imports around 6.4 to 7 million barrels per day to meet the technical demand of its refineries, which are designed to process heavier crudes than those produced domestically—this is where heavy Venezuelan oil comes into play. Projections indicate that net imports will fall significantly in 2026, reaching their lowest levels since 1971. The United States relies on its neighbors to cover the deficit. It imports 4.3 million barrels per day from Canada, which represents 60% of the total imported; from Mexico 7%, half a million barrels per day and from Venezuela barely 250,000 barrels per day, 3%.
Fracking is the primary driver of oil production in the United States, while in Canada it is a complementary technique to its main source, oil sands. In the United States, oil extracted through fracking accounts for 73% of total production, representing approximately 9.6 to 10.2 million barrels per day. The ecological damage of the system is of little concern; what matters is independence at the cost of monumental erosion and with costs four times higher than those in the Middle East. These techniques involve costly and ongoing investments, and without certainty, it will be very difficult to secure the necessary financial resources to maintain the current production level, which is likely nearing its peak.
Canada is projected to produce between 5.2 and 5.4 million barrels per day, with fracking accounting for 10% to 15% of its production, while oil sands account for 3.5 million barrels per day . Canada's oil sands hold the world's fourth-largest proven oil reserves, with approximately 159 billion barrels (98% of the country's total reserves). These sands are undoubtedly the main draw for Trump's appetite to absorb Canada . A disruption to this supply would seriously jeopardize US energy security and justify military intervention in Trump's global vision. China is the primary stakeholder in accessing this oil given the potential disruption to Venezuelan and Iranian oil supplies, and this explains the recent agreements between Canada and China.
However, this strength comes with significant weaknesses. The minimum break-even price needed for oil production to be profitable ranges from $40 to $70 per barrel, depending on whether it comes from existing fields or new investments. Fracking is viable and profitable at prices above $65 for newly drilled wells. Oil sands production is even more expensive than fracking due to the high capital and energy requirements for extraction and initial refining.
In other words, the United States needs high prices above $70 to make its finances profitable, hence its efforts to limit production in other countries like Russia and to control major producers to prevent them from colluding against high prices. A drop in the price of oil below $40 would have devastating effects on North American oil production. But the outlook is on the edge, as Goldman Sachs predicts that the price will continue to fall, averaging $56 by the end of the year, because supply growth will continue to outpace global demand. This price war, however, clashes with another of Trump's wars: the economy and the priority of " affordability ," for which the United States places a fundamental emphasis on gasoline prices.
But the oil war isn't just fought at home. Harming enemies is part of this conflict . China imported a record 13.18 million barrels per day in December 2025. China's supply structure is led by Middle Eastern nations and Russia. Saudi Arabia is the top exporter with 1.72 million barrels per day, followed by Russia with one million, a figure that continues to decline, even though its subsidized price is well below market value, suggesting severe production problems in Russia. Eighty percent of Iran's oil exports go to China (almost 19% of its total imports), while 81% of Venezuelan oil goes to China, representing almost one million barrels per day. A downturn in these two countries would have a very significant victim: China.
The Asian giant is well aware of this situation and the importance of strategic reserves should the global situation become more challenging for its interests. For this reason, China has been pursuing an aggressive strategy of stockpiling strategic and commercial reserves for several years. It is projected that China will add 11 new reserve facilities between 2025 and 2026 to bolster its energy security and build up a buffer of several months' worth of consumption that it could use in the event of conflict or to disrupt American fracking.
The second war, partly related to the first, is over electricity— the energy the world needs to function. All studies project increases in global electricity demand exceeding 5% annually, driven by both aggressive development plans in Africa and the needs of AI data centers. This electricity war reflects the reality of the situation in the world's major economies.
The first indication that China has already surpassed the United States is in electricity consumption. China produces, and therefore consumes, twice as much electricity as the United States (10.4 TWh vs. 4.24 TWh). The European Union produces 2,800 TWh, with demand projected to grow by 1.5% in 2026. This means the United States needs to significantly increase its electricity production, and oil is insufficient, while renewable energy sources don't inspire enough confidence in Trump.
China's energy model is evolving much faster than in any other country. Wind and solar power already account for approximately 22% of total consumption. For the first time in 50 years, coal-fired power generation began to decline simultaneously in China and India thanks to record levels of clean energy. China manufactured 12.9 million electric vehicles in 2025, compared to two million in the United States. Currently, there are 50 million electric vehicles on the road in China, compared to ten million in the United States, making the US far more dependent on oil than India, which has a more diversified energy mix.
In the United States , total electricity production grew by 3.1% in 2025. This growth is primarily driven by solar power, which met 61% of the increased demand last year. By 2026, nuclear generation is expected to reach 800 TWh with the reactivation of plants like Palisades. A reversal of renewable energy support policies will have dire consequences for power generation if more nuclear plants are not brought online, posing additional challenges, including the extraordinary international dependence on uranium.
The energy trade in its various forms (oil, gas, coal) has been undergoing a near-revolutionary period since the war in Ukraine. It could almost be argued that the biggest beneficiary of the war is the United States; it maintains the embargo on Russian oil and has replaced Moscow as the main supplier of LNG. The United States was the first country to surpass 111 million metric tons of LNG exports annually by 2025, and a 9% growth is expected by then.
Europe remains the dominant destination, absorbing a large share of LNG to replace Russian gas. In December 2025, 9 million tons were shipped from the United States to Europe. Asia accounts for approximately 64% of global LNG imports, although demand in China and Japan shows signs of moderation by 2026 due to the advancement of renewable and nuclear energy. Spain has doubled its gas purchases from the US in the last year to offset its heavy reliance on Russia. Against the backdrop of a trade war with Russia, Europe is pursuing plans to increase its LNG production and diversify its current dependence on the United States, which undoubtedly has a significant impact on the state of the US-European relationship.
But the Old Continent is accelerating its plans. In the second quarter of 2025, more than half of the EU's electricity ( 54%) came from renewable sources. Solar generation reached record levels, surpassing the combined total of coal and lignite in the European energy mix for the first time. Although demand is at historically low levels (similar to those of two decades ago), a gradual recovery is expected by 2027. The European Union has completed a drastic reconfiguration of its oil supply by 2026, consolidating Norway and the United States as its main suppliers after the near-total weaning off of Russian crude.
Given the growing global electricity needs stemming from increased demand due to the electrification of cars and air conditioners caused by global warming, and from the consumption of new data centers, which are estimated to impact an annual growth of 4% for the coming years, the bottleneck is infrastructure. By 2035, it is estimated that major economies will need to add or upgrade 73 million kilometers of power lines, requiring a multi-trillion dollar investment essential to meet demand and prevent economic activity from grinding to a halt. Europe and the United States will have to absorb more than half of this investment, and to do so they need financing in a world with increasingly tight liquidity.
Although renewables will grow strongly, adding 4.5 terawatts by 2030, from that year onwards integration costs and a lack of suitable sites will begin to limit their ability to meet peak demand, and only nuclear power offers the security that the system requires.
Nuclear energy accounts for between 19% Of the total produced in the United States, nuclear power accounts for 25% of total electricity generation, making it the world's largest generator of nuclear electricity in absolute volume, with approximately 787 TWh generated in recent years. Nuclear power is a crucial source of emissions-free electricity, although natural gas remains the primary source in the overall energy mix. By 2026, nuclear power will slightly surpass coal, whose share is estimated to fall to 16-17% due to the rise of renewables, which are projected to reach 25% of the total.
As of January 2026, the United States has a total of 55 operational nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants are leading us toward a third war, the war over minerals like uranium and rare earth elements. A typical 1,000 MWe commercial nuclear reactor (the average capacity in the U.S.) consumes approximately 27 metric tons of enriched uranium per year. Nationally, total US uranium consumption by 2026 is estimated at over 50 million pounds (approximately 22,700 tons) to fuel its fleet of 94 reactors. This year is particularly significant due to the upward pressure on uranium prices, which are projected to reach or exceed $100-$135 per pound due to increased demand from AI data centers and the reactivation of nuclear facilities such as Palisades.
By 2026, U.S. uranium mining production is estimated to be approximately 1 million pounds (about 450 metric tons). There is a significant gap of about 46 to 47 million pounds annually (21,000 metric tons) between what the country produces and what its nuclear power plants consume (which is approximately 50 million pounds per year). Historically, the U.S. has imported about 99% of the uranium it uses, primarily from countries such as Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan.
In 2026, the European Union's annual uranium consumption is estimated at around 13,000 metric tons of natural uranium (tU). This figure represents approximately 20% of global uranium demand. Unlike the United States, which has implemented strict bans, the EU maintains a complex import profile due to its technological dependence. The European Union imports virtually 100% of the uranium it consumes, with strategic diversification led by the following countries: Canada, 36%; Kazakhstan, 24%; and Russia, 15% (down from 23% following the European Commission's 2025 roadmap to eliminate energy dependence). Australia accounts for 10-17%, and Niger's share has decreased significantly (from 24% to less than 5%) due to political instability following the 2023 coup, which has opened another security front in the Sahel.
Due to geopolitical uncertainty, European electricity companies have maintained a policy of overbuying and storage in 2025 and 2026. In 2024, purchases by EU companies (13,667 tU) exceeded the actual consumption of reactors to create safety reserves.
By 2026, China had solidified its position as the country with the world's most ambitious nuclear expansion program, which had dramatically increased both its number of nuclear power plants and its need to import uranium. At the beginning of 2026, China had 61 reactors in operation and approximately 30 more under construction, maintaining its rate of approving between 6 and 10 new units per year. It had already surpassed 60 gigawatts of installed capacity, making it the world's second-largest nuclear power. The Chinese government maintains its goal of reaching 150 GW by 2035, which would entail building an average of 7 to 8 reactors annually. This pace would be unthinkable under Western legislation.
China is the world's largest buyer of uranium to fuel its rapid expansion and build strategic reserves. It imports between 22,000 and 25,000 metric tons of uranium annually, which accounts for 75-80% of its uranium consumption, as its domestic production is limited (around 1,600-1,900 metric tons per year). Kazakhstan is its main partner, supplying more than 50% of its imports through long-term contracts with Kazatomprom. China holds majority stakes in two of Namibia's largest uranium mines (Husab and Rössing). Uzbekistan and Canada make up the remaining supply.
Unlike other countries, China employs a "source ownership" strategy. Instead of simply purchasing uranium on the open market, Chinese state-owned enterprises (such as CGN and CNNC) acquire shares in or outright ownership of mines abroad (particularly in Africa and Central Asia) to ensure that fuel flows directly to their nuclear reactors without intermediaries . Many of these mines are operated by Chinese workers subjected to military discipline, while their governments are directly monitored by Beijing.
As of January 2026, the global rare earth (rare mineral) export market remains overwhelmingly dominated by China, although other countries have increased their share in response to recent export restrictions imposed by Beijing. China controls 70% of global mining production and 90% of global refining, and in 2025 it exported 62,585 metric tons of rare earths, a 12.9% increase over the previous year, reaching its highest level in a decade despite growing geopolitical constraints. Beijing has recently implemented export controls on heavy and medium elements, as well as magnets, in response to US tariffs.
Myanmar, a military dictatorship under Beijing's influence, has established itself as a critical exporter, primarily of heavy rare earth elements. Almost all of its exports go to China for processing. In 2024 and 2025, it accounted for approximately 8% of global production.
Australia is the world's third-largest exporter by volume and a key alternative for the West, while the United States is the second-largest mineral producer (primarily through the Mountain Pass mine in California). Historically, much of its ore was exported to China for refining. However, by 2026, domestic processing capacity has increased thanks to federal subsidies, reducing its reliance on Chinese refining and positioning it as a growing exporter of semi-processed products to allies. Other emerging exporters include Malaysia, which has become the second-largest exporter to China, specializing in concentrate processing, and Vietnam and Brazil, which hold the largest reserves after China.
As of January 2026, the largest importers of rare earths are divided into two categories: those who buy raw ore for processing (paradoxically led by China) and those who import refined metals and compounds for their high-tech industry.
Japan is historically the largest importer of refined rare earth metals for use by its powerful automotive and technology industries, which rely critically on these materials for manufacturing high-performance permanent magnets and advanced electronics. Due to its dependence on China, Japan has led global efforts to invest in alternative mines in Australia (Lynas) and Vietnam , but it is still far from meeting its total needs.
The EU is a massive net importer due to its lack of large-scale operational mines. In 2025 and 2026, the EU will import approximately 46% of its rare earth elements from China, followed by Russia (28%) and Malaysia (20%). Germany stands out as the leading importer within the bloc, followed by France and the Netherlands, primarily for their renewable energy and defense sectors.
Much is said about rare earth elements, but little is explained about their importance and applications. One of the most relevant is for high-performance permanent magnets (Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium) used in electric vehicle motors (an average Tesla uses about 2-3 kg) and in offshore wind turbines. They are also essential for hard drives, smartphone speakers, and industrial robotics. In the aerospace field, Samarium and Terbium stand out with applications in missile guidance systems, radars, night vision devices, and satellite communications. Another important use is in displays and optics, with Europium, Yttrium, and Lanthanum providing the red color in LED and OLED screens. Lanthanum is used for lenses in high-end cameras and telescopes due to its high refractive index and for batteries in hybrid vehicles. Cerium is used in catalysts and oil refining to "break down" crude oil molecules and turn them into gasoline, and in catalytic converters for combustion cars to reduce emissions.
As of January 2026, several countries possess massive reserves of rare earth elements that remain largely untapped due to technical, environmental, or political challenges. While China dominates current production, the map of the largest untapped reserves is headed by Brazil (21 million tons), although its mining production does not reach 20 million tons. Vietnam follows with reserves of up to 22 million tons, which, since January 1st of this year, has prohibited the export of raw ore, requiring foreign companies to invest in local processing plants to unlock this strategic potential. Next is Russia with 10-12 million tons, with reserves in remote regions of Siberia and facing international sanctions that complicate the investment necessary for their large-scale exploitation. Finally, India has estimated reserves of 7 million tons. It is worth noting other recent discoveries in Norway at the Fen complex that suggest the presence of one of the largest rare earth deposits in continental Europe, although its commercial exploitation is not expected before the end of the decade, and Turkey, which recently announced the discovery of a massive deposit in Eskisehir that, if its cut-off grades are confirmed, could rank among the largest untapped reserves in the world.
And indeed , Greenland It possesses some of the world's largest reserves of both uranium and rare earth elements, although their extraction faces significant legal and logistical restrictions in 2026. Regarding uranium, Greenland harbors massive deposits, most notably the Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit) deposit, considered the eighth largest in the world with an estimated 270,000 tons. In 2021, the Greenlandic government reinstated a ban on uranium mining. This law prohibits any mining project where the uranium concentration exceeds 100 parts per million, which has halted projects where uranium is a byproduct of rare earth elements, a mineral the United States needs to secure its supply of. The island contains approximately 10% of the world's rare earth reserves, estimated at around 36 million tons (of which 1.5 million are proven and economically viable reserves by 2026). It is rich in critical minerals such as neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, and dysprosium, essential for electric vehicle magnets and wind turbines. In addition to those mentioned, Greenland's subsoil contains 25 of the 34 minerals considered critical by the European Union, including: Zinc and lead: Significant deposits in Citronen Fjord. Graphite, nickel, and cobalt: Essential for battery manufacturing. Iron ore: Especially in the Isua region.
Despite this wealth, 80% of the territory remains covered by ice, and the lack of basic infrastructure (roads and ports) continues to be the main obstacle preventing Greenland from becoming a major exporter in the short term.
The fourth war is the moral one . The United States is the most multicultural country in the world, which has historically led to an intense effort to reaffirm the nation in order to achieve the unity a great power needs. The constant reaffirmation of symbols like the flag, the anthem, and the Bible can only be explained by the fear of the disappearance of that unity created by the Founding Fathers. The most intense public debate within the country is undoubtedly the moral or religious question and its influence on policies such as immigration, family law, abortion, and sexual freedom. Until the end of the last century, the predominant religious doctrine was Calvinism, which maintains that hard work and economic prosperity are signs of moral virtue, thus driving A highly competitive economic system and a "self-made man" culture, where personal success is perceived as an individual responsibility and not merely a matter of luck or privilege . This religious concept, which lies at the foundation of the nation, is threatened by Catholic immigration and the rise of progressive movements.
The emergence of the Tea Party at the beginning of the century represents the Republican effort to return to founding values and principles, employing a conservative political view of religion to impose a dominant white, Protestant national culture. Trump has taken up this mantle to attract the entire vast American conservative movement.
Protestant influence, especially from evangelical denominations, remains a decisive electoral force. The evangelical vote continues to be a solid bloc that prioritizes issues such as religious freedom, the appointment of conservative judges, and policies supporting the traditional family. It is common for Republican political leaders to use religious rhetoric (such as the term "one nation under God") to appeal to a manifest destiny or an exceptional mission of the United States in the world.
Just as James Monroe did in 1823, Republican administrations have striven to protect the nation from the degraded moral and religious values that have spread through Europe, which they see not as an ally, but as a threat in their moral war. The threat that arose in the most progressive states, such as the Northeast and California, in the 1970s is being countered with a policy that reverts to the most antiquated racial, religious, and moral values of the 1950s. This is the America Trump refers to when he says "Make America Great Again."
The threat is very palpable in society, and although the number of religiously unaffiliated people ( nons ) is growing, the aesthetics and language of Protestantism permeate even secular sectors, defining what many consider the "American way of life." By 2026, the non-religious population in the United States (known as the "nons" —atheists, agnostics, or people without a particular religion) will reach an all-time high, solidifying its position as the fastest-growing demographic group in the country. It is estimated that approximately 30%–32% of adults in the U.S. now identify as non-religious. This group represented only 7% in 1972 and 16% in 2007. Its growth has accelerated dramatically in the last decade. The "nons" now outnumber Catholics (approximately 20%) and are comparable in size to the evangelical Protestant population. The evolution is mainly driven by generational replacement: Generation Z and Millennials: Around 45% -50% of young adults identify as non-religious in 2026. However, and as a result of this conservative revolution, the Silent Generation and Boomers maintain much higher levels of religious affiliation, but even in these groups a slight trend towards religious disaffection is observed.
It is important to note that "non-religious" does not always mean "non-spiritual": Only a minority strictly identifies as atheist (approximately 17%) or agnostic (approximately 20%). The majority (63%) simply identify as "nothing in particular," and many of them still express belief in some kind of higher power or practice individual forms of spirituality—what in Spain we might call seekers of exotic spiritual truths.
This shift is transforming the electoral landscape. Non-religious voters tend to overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party and prioritize the separation of church and state, science, and social justice over traditional conservative values, leading to a radicalization among Democrats that is still far removed from the majority sentiment. But for Republicans, this transformation is a real threat, hence their maneuvers to restrict voting rights or redraw electoral maps.
Immigration policy, ICE actions, and the return of religion to daily life, often imposed by force, are intimately linked to this moral issue. Latin American immigrants are deeply religious but far removed from Calvinist doctrine, thus becoming a threat to the American way of life. The crusade against the LGBTQ+ community is a fundamental part of this social and moral re-engineering project undertaken by this administration, which finds significant electoral support, especially in the more conservative states of the interior. This moral war transforms political opponents into sworn enemies, since they are seen as acting against God. The goal is not to reach consensus but to impose one way of life on another, and in this battle, denigration, insults, threats, violence, and the fraudulent use of constitutional values are indispensable weapons for victory.
The battle for military leadership is the fifth one. Throughout this year, Trump has sent serious messages about his concerns regarding the management of military resources. Maintaining a loyal armed forces required waging a moral war within the military to ensure loyalty should the political or moral conflict escalate beyond rhetoric, or should it become necessary to act above the Constitution.
The president recently announced that the defense budget would reach $1.5 trillion, a 50% increase, claiming this is the figure needed to compete with China's rise. Finally, last week he issued a threat to the defense industry, which he said is unable to adjust its costs, accelerate delivery times, and innovate at the pace of its rivals in Beijing.
The latest data shows that Chinese military superiority is a relatively short-lived prospect. A communist regime with low military salaries and a militarized industry and science sector presents too much competition for the affluent American military, scientists, and contractors.
China continues to lead the world in shipbuilding volume. During 2025, it delivered 10 major surface combatants and submarines, notably the Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers, of which at least three additional guided-missile destroyers were delivered, forming the backbone of its escort fleet. Two units of its new-generation Type O54B frigates with advanced anti-submarine capabilities were also delivered, along with three conventional missile submarines (Type 039C) and possibly one nuclear-powered submarine. A key milestone in 2026 was the formal commissioning of the Fujian-class aircraft carrier (Type 003).
The US naval industry, hampered by supply chain bottlenecks, delivered only six major vessels in 2025: two Arleigh Burke-class (Flight III) destroyers (the future USS Ted Stevens and USS Jeremiah Denton ), equipped with the advanced AN/SPY-6 radar. Despite delays, two Virginia-class attack submarines (the USS New Jersey and USS Iowa ) were delivered under the Block IV construction program, while the final delivery of the Freedom variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (the USS Beloit or USS Cleveland ) marked the end of this controversial program. Finally, one San Antonio-class (LPD-17 Flight II) vessel was delivered.
By the beginning of 2026, the difference in industrial capacity is striking: China possesses a commercial and military shipbuilding capacity more than 100 times greater than that of the United States in terms of gross tonnage. China maintains the world's largest fleet by number of ships (approximately 375), while the U.S. remains close to 295, although with a significant advantage in total tonnage and firepower per vessel.
In 2025, both the United States and China reached fighter jet production and delivery levels that reflected an intense race for air superiority , with the United States surpassing delivery records thanks to the resolution of previous technical problems and China stabilizing mass production of fifth-generation fighters.
The US aviation industry, led by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, delivered a significant volume of aircraft in 2025. A record 191 F-35 Lightning IIs were delivered that year. This exceptional increase was due to the release of a large inventory of aircraft that had been stored for a year awaiting the TR-3 software upgrade. Of this total, approximately 18% were previously built units. Boeing delivered additional military aircraft, including the F-15EX Eagle II (whose production is slated to increase to 24 units annually by 2026) and the F/A-18 Block III, although the F-15 delivery rate was slower than in previous years. In total, Boeing reported the delivery of 127 military aircraft in 2025, including helicopters and other types of aircraft.
Although China does not publish exact official delivery figures, intelligence and defense analysts estimate a total of approximately 250 fighter jets by 2025. Of the J-20 (Mighty Dragon): approximately 120 units of this fifth-generation fighter were delivered in 2025 (including J-20A and J-20S variants). The certification and deployment of the J-35 (naval variant for the Fujian aircraft carrier) and the J-35A (land-based variant) were confirmed in 2025, with some units already in operational service. Regarding improved fourth-generation fighters, approximately 140 additional units of models such as the J-16 (heavy fighter) and the J-10C were delivered. In 2026, China is expected to surpass the United States' annual production if Lockheed Martin stabilizes its F-35 production after depleting its backlog and if parity between fifth-generation aircraft is achieved by the end of the decade.
By 2025, space had solidified its position as the fastest-growing military domain. While exact figures for strictly "military" satellites are often classified, data on national security and defense launches show unprecedented activity.
The United States launched approximately 110 to 130 military and national security satellites in 2025. Most of the launches were from the "Proliferated" program. Warfighter Space Architecture." Dozens of transport and tracking layer satellites designed for secure communications and hypersonic missile detection were put into orbit.
China launched approximately 90 military satellites in 2025, keeping the pace of a launch by week. Serie Yaogan is the main family of intelligence satellites searching and reconnaissance. In 2025 several Yaogan 41, 42 y 43 were launched including Synthetic Aperture Radarand high resolution optics sensors. In communications and navigation several satellites Shijian series were launched (some of them with orbital maneuver capacity and waste cleaning consider by US as double use equipment. Regarding to Low Orbit constellations, China started the massive deployment of its own mega constellations like Qianfan or G60 with civilian purpose but keeping an infrastructure for military communications ).
In terms of total mass put into orbit, the United States maintained an almost 3 to 1 advantage in 2025, thanks to the reusability and frequency of the Falcon 9 rockets, although China is making substantial investments to match the Americans by 2030.
By 2025, the production and delivery of long-range missiles (both strategic/nuclear and conventional precision) has been the number one priority for both powers. Although the exact figures are state secrets, defense budgets and intelligence reports from early 2026 allow us to establish the following numbers:
China possesses the largest and most diverse missile production capacity in the world. By 2025, it is estimated to have delivered between 600 and 900 long-range missiles (considering ranges exceeding 1,000 km): Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): An estimated 40 to 60 units of the DF-41 and DF-31AG models will be delivered. China is in the midst of a massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal, constructing hundreds of new silos in the north of the country. Intermediate-Range Missiles (IRBMs): Delivery of approximately 100-150 units of the DF-26 (nicknamed "Guam Express"), capable of carrying out highly accurate conventional and nuclear strikes against naval and land targets. Long-Range Cruise Missiles: Production of more than 500 units of the CJ-10 and CJ-20 series, launched from land, air, and sea. Hypersonic Weapons: China leads in this field, delivering operational DF-17 units (with hypersonic glider) at an estimated rate of 20 to 30 units per year.
After decades focused on regional conflicts, the US drastically accelerated its missile production in 2025 to counter China's numerical advantage. It delivered between 450 and 550 Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs), the long-range missiles that were the highlight of 2025. Having reached full operational capability, Lockheed Martin delivered more than 250 units of this missile, which replaces the ATACMS and has a range exceeding 500 km (expandable to 1,000 km). Approximately 100-120 new and modernized Tomahawk (Block V) missiles were delivered to the Navy and, for the first time in decades, to ground units of the Marine Corps and Army (Typhon System). Regarding hypersonic missiles, in 2025 the US finally delivered the first operational Dark Eagle (LRHW) units to the Army, with ranges exceeding 2,700 km, although the number is limited (fewer than 10 units for testing and initial deployment). Finally, in nuclear modernization (ICBMs), no new operational missiles were delivered, as the Sentinel program (which will replace the Minuteman III) is still in the testing phase and facing cost delays.
As 2026 begins, China's advantage lies in its stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, an area in which the US was barred from competing until 2019 by the INF Treaty. However, the US is closing this gap through the mass production of stealth cruise missiles (such as the JASSM-ER) and the rapid proliferation of the PrSM system in the Pacific theater.
Economic leadership is the latest battle Trump is waging, and his main visible enemy is the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, hence the willingness to use anything to eliminate him. His primary objective is to overcome the reluctance of large corporations to repatriate the production of technological components that compromise strategic independence and economic leadership.
American economic power has traditionally been based on a strong currency that supported its macroeconomic weaknesses, on the exploitation of its natural resources, on a powerful consumer industry, and on having led the last two great industrial and technological revolutions: the internet revolution and currently the AI revolution.
But many of these strengths have been weakening. Trump's policies and battles have led to the dollar devaluing against the euro from 1.02 to 1.16 in just one year. This weakness facilitates exports but undermines a fundamental pillar of an economy that will need almost two trillion dollars in financing this year, more than Spain's GDP. In December 2025 alone, a record deficit of 145 billion dollars was reached, financing that demands a high degree of confidence in the United States' political and economic system. Trump's flagship measure, tariffs, generated customs revenues of 90 billion dollars in the last quarter, compared to 20.8 billion dollars the previous year. In other words, far from being paid by the countries themselves, the tariffs have been absorbed as an additional tax by US companies and citizens, which undoubtedly hinders consumption and investment and puts upward pressure on prices.
GDP is projected to grow by 2.2% in 2026, but inflation will remain above 2.4%, while job creation reached its lowest point in 2025, with only half a million jobs created that year—half the number from the previous year and a quarter of the number created two years prior. A 4% unemployment rate and immigration restrictions will significantly impact job growth in the coming years and put upward pressure on wages, leading to higher inflation and increased public debt, which has already reached 122% of GDP. The trade deficit remains at similar levels, as higher import costs have offset increased exports, particularly of gas.
These indicators suggest that the economy is holding up, supported by private consumption and investment in artificial intelligence, although it faces risks from the cost of living and high public debt that could lead to a recession that would sink stock market values fueled by very positive future estimates from North American technology companies.
At the start of 2026, the US trade deficit showed a stabilization trend after the extreme volatility of the previous five years. The trend had shifted from record highs during the pandemic to a phase of "high stagnation" marked by the relocation of supply chains. Preliminary data from the end of 2025 indicated that the deficit had stabilized at around $820 billion, the largest in the world. A key factor this year was the increase in imports of technological components for data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructure.
Nearshoring and friendshoring phenomena are consolidating . Mexico has positioned itself as the leading trading partner, surpassing China in import volume for the third consecutive year. The trade deficit with China has continued its downward trend or stagnated due to trade restrictions and tariffs that remain in place through 2026.
The United States is experiencing a massive surge in imports of artificial intelligence hardware, making these components a record part of its foreign trade in 2025 and early 2026. The value of imports of automatic data processing machines (which include high-end GPUs and CPUs, key components for AI) skyrocketed in 2025: total imports reached $125.8 billion in the first seven months of the year alone, a 69% increase over the same period in 2024.
The United States relies heavily on foreign suppliers, particularly from Asia, for its most advanced AI hardware. The main countries from which the US imports AI hardware are: a) Mexico, which It has become a key re-export and assembly hub under the USMCA agreement, with imports of data processing machines nearly doubling in 2025, reaching $45.9 billion through July. b) Taiwan is a critical partner, as it is home to TSMC, the world’s leading manufacturer of the most advanced AI chips (such as Nvidia’s H100 and H200). Imports from Taiwan more than doubled in 2025. c) Vietnam : Imports of technology hardware and data center-related components from Vietnam also saw strong growth in 2025, doubling over the same period as Taiwan. d) China : While still a major source of general electronics, imports of AI hardware from China have halved due to US tariffs and export controls in 2025–2026. The US strategy in 2026 is to incentivize investment and chip manufacturing within the country, such as TSMC's announced investment plans, and further diversify the global supply chain.
The American economy faces critical threats. The expansion of the welfare state in a country that already spends 17% of its GDP on healthcare and is experiencing an aging population is a heavy burden on the productive model and public finances. The purchasing power of the working class in the most Republican-leaning states is eroding every year and will increase with tariffs and restrictions on e-commerce with China. Dependence on foreign markets is enormous and limits the autonomy sought by Trump's policies. The loss of economic leadership will produce a seismic shift in the United States' ability to absorb the enormous deterioration of its public finances, which are accumulating a deficit of 5% of GDP each year.
All these wars and the global impact they are generating could not be understood without the latest war, Trump's war against humanity or against himself, depending on how you look at it . Shakespeare is considered the greatest playwright in history for his characters who, like no other, reflect human virtues and flaws, especially those of people in positions of power. As many experts have described him, Trump is a mixture of the sweet words Richard III used to soften the bitterness of life and his willingness to disregard ethical norms to maintain power; the narcissistic, flattering King Lear who eagerly demands absolute loyalty; and finally, General Coriolanus, whose immense pride leads him to despise the masses and who cannot tolerate any mockery or disrespect, reacting with indescribable derision that leads him to claim that the gods were already mocking him.
While the character bears all the hallmarks of someone who suffered in childhood, incapable of accepting ridicule or failure, his political life began at a correspondents' dinner in 2011 when Obama, tired of his diatribes against his background, race, and family, ridiculed him live on air, provoking such anger that even today he feels the former president remains superior because of the Nobel Peace Prize, because he killed Bin Laden, and because he achieved enormous national leadership. Surely Trump won't have time to witness the defeat of all these wars, but all his steps are in the opposite direction of what the interests of the United States advise, because in the pathological conflict between the United States and Trump, he will always want to emerge victorious, and that is why he has imposed the power of the grotesque, because it is in that arena where he feels safe and victorious, and he will not accept any defeat, because then he will not hesitate to use violence or pressure until he achieves his objectives, and this is the real danger: that in the world's war against Trump, he intends to emerge victorious.
