THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE TRUMP ERA.

 

History and the economy progress in a cyclical way, or rather in a process of advance and slowdown of varying intensity. Both steps are necessary for the world to continue its path. Trump's arrival has not happened by chance, nor it is the result of an unpredictable political irruption. It reflects many of the changes that are taking place in many societies because of a long period of progress in policies of all kinds.

Often, the changes brought about by technological, political, or social revolutions advance much faster than the population's capacity to absorb them and this produces these moments of revision. The most paradigmatic case is the Roman Empire, which created a society a thousand years ahead of the times of history, hence the Middle Ages represented an enormous setback that slowed down the changes that did not settle until the Modern Age.

Another decisive phenomenon in the changes is that, although there is a certain international consensus or, let's say, a surge of voices calling for a complete rethinking, there needs to be a leader, a country that has enough influence and power to drive the historic changes. In this case, the arrival of Trump is very relevant for this new world to become a reality.

The description of all the changes would take years and the analysis of their impact much longer. It is necessary to focus on those aspects that I consider most relevant for their meaning or their impact. The change in mentality is determined by the change in the global economic paradigm of the last 25 years.

Let's take the Fortune index of the 50 companies with the highest revenues in the world. In 2000, of the 10 largest companies, 5 were from the United States, 4 from Japan and 1 German. In 2024, 8 are American, one from Taiwan and one from Saudi Arabia. If we look at the TOP 50, in 2000 there were 15 American, 18 Japanese and 6 German companies. In 2024, there are 25 American, 12 Chinese, 3 German and 1 Japanese company. Only this long-term perspective allows us to understand the revolution that has taken place in the world with the emergence of China and the continued growth of the United States.

In 2000, the European company with the largest market capitalization was Nokia with 219 billion dollars. In 2024 it is the luxury group LVMH with 344 billion dollars. In the United States in year 2000, it was Microsoft with 586 billion dollars and today it is Apple with 3.458 billion dollars, which clearly indicates the different direction of the most advanced economies in the world. Japan and Europe face another period of sharp decline while China and the United States will monopolize much more power in the coming years. Even the major European luxury companies have Asians among their stars, so it won't be long before we lose this leadership in design as well.

This scenario of less European and Japanese weight in the world and greater relevance of the two giants can lead us either to a great global war or to the creation of two great empires that will treat the rest of the world as colonies.

However, China faces more significant risks than the United States. Its political system, its declining demographics and the growing competition from India, which already surpasses it in population, will tend to reduce its importance in the world in the medium and long term, although it will continue to be tremendously relevant in the remainder of the decade.

In a world driven by two large poles that will be less concerned about climate change, European countries cannot remain on the sidelines of this trend in order not to lose competitiveness. Consequently, the major environmental objectives will be delayed for a few years.

The Draghi report on European competitiveness identifies the main European objective, along with the innovation gap and economic security, as the decarbonization of the economy. The green economy is not an opportunity for economic growth, it is a cost that we must assume in order not to condemn the planet to self-destruction. However, given the trends of the United States, China and India, investing resources in decarbonization without considering the criteria of competitiveness and greater efficiency will negatively affect the cost structure of European companies and deepen the crisis that we have already suffered in Europe since the beginning of the century.

Another aspect will be trade. The United States is much less vulnerable than China, which depends more on imports of raw materials and energy and on exports of consumer products to maintain its growth path. This gap is the one that presents the greatest danger for the geostrategic scenario. Faced with a more dominant and independent United States, China will need political expansion in Africa and the Pacific to find sufficient supplies for its shortages. But if China continues to hoard critical materials, the United States will be forced to face a crisis that will lead to a global economic crisis. The US could find itself in a weak position that would not be very encouraging for global security.

The domination of space by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by China, will mean that Europe and the most neutral countries will see their access to many of the advantages that will be obtained from the exploitation of space greatly diminished, although this will happen in the longer term. If Europe and its companies lose the space race, the effect on competitiveness and economic growth will be very negative. Space X has already launched more rockets into space than the rest of the world in its entire history and intends to create a constellation of tens of thousands of satellites in orbit. This is only possible with a public and private investment that no one else in the world can match and thanks to a unique gathering of talent in the world.

The melting of the Arctic will open up a huge space on the planet to traffic and to the exploitation of the seabed. Russia has been positioning itself in this space for years, but the interest of the United States in Greenland, a country four times the size of Spain, must be understood in this line. The war for the resources of the north of the planet will open another scenario of attention and collision.

Another key aspect in the economy will be the deepening in the world of as a continuation of the process of digitalization of the economy started in the nineties. Europe has lost 40% of its competitiveness with respect to the United States so far this century due to its delay in incorporating new technologies and by remaining anchored in traditional industry that will be greatly hampered by the new technologies that will end up dominating the industry as a whole. If in 2002 China competed in 25% of the products manufactured in Europe, today it already competes in 40%, and will reach 50% at the end of the decade with much lower total costs and with a quality, in the worst case, similar to that of Europe.

The demographic element contributes very significantly to worsening these problems. While the birth rate is still strong in the United States, to which Latin Americans contribute significantly, in Europe the national population is already declining and obviously aging, while immigration will decrease every year in the face of worse economic prospects. Given the measures that Europe must adopt to reduce its competitiveness gap with the rest of the world, it is very likely that the trend will be the opposite and that there may even be negative immigration balances in Europe in the coming years, which will dynamite the labor and social protection structure.

In conclusion, the continued loss of competitiveness in Europe since the beginning of the century can only be reduced with a radical change in European policies, which will require the transformation of the economic and social model that has governed Europe in the last four decades.

As can be deduced from the above explanations, the role that remains for the company to reverse this scenario is reduced, but it is not irrelevant.

Given the growing wave of protectionism, the national approach to business must be intensified. If in the previous model internationality was an asset, governments will tend to protect their national companies. This will mean that business organization models will have to be more decentralized by country, renouncing the approximation by international verticals, since the methodologies, regulations and cost structures will differ by country and common approximations cannot be established for different nations.

Added to this we will see the reduction of international intra-company flows that will be more persecuted by this new wave of national preference. Companies will have to pay special attention to regulations that could affect the free movement of economic flows.

In the face of climate change strategies, we are not going to fall into denialism, however the mastermind of the new North American administration has been the greatest promoter of the electric vehicle. However, the need to increase energy independence and self-sufficiency will lead to an expansion of nuclear energy and to a lesser extent of fossil fuels, which will see significant growth in the coming years. Renewable energies will continue to grow but will have fewer incentives, so only in countries with greater efficient generation capacity will we find significant variations.

Europe needs to drastically reduce its energy costs to regain competitiveness, so the movement towards nuclear and fossil fuels will have a greater boost in the Old Continent. The matrix that we have been building for years makes us less competitive and this is a burden that we cannot accept in exchange for improving life on the planet while that others pollute more and eat up our market share. In addition, replacing Russia as the reference energy supplier with others has already consumed an enormous amount of resources and will make cost reduction difficult for at least ten years.

Bearing in mind that rich Europe has salaries comparable to those in the United States, the competitiveness gap lies in: the lower investment in Research, Development and Innovation in Europe in relation to the rest of the countries; in the cost of energy; and in the burden of regulation. This is because economic priorities are focused on social issues and that there is not enough talent and innovation infrastructure in Europe to absorb a significant increase in R&D investments in the short and medium term.

Companies will have to dedicate increasing amounts to R&D&I, which will force them to alter their cost structure, which will be impossible with increasing labor costs and with electricity three times higher than in the United States. Regulatory costs and land shortages contribute to lower European competitiveness and represent additional burdens. If there is no brutal action by governments to solve these problems, the situation will worsen.

The digitalization of the economy is the most significant element of this loss of competitiveness. Of the 50 largest technology companies in the world, only four are European. This gap explains why so far this century the European economy has grown by an average of 1.5%, that of the United States by 2.2% and that of China by 8.3%, very significant differences.

All these detailed elements imply that the greatest factor of economic growth in Europe in recent decades, international trade, will contract worldwide and Europe will lose a very substantial part of its main tool for growth. Let us consider that between 2000 and 2023 the weight of international trade in European GDP went from 30% to 46%, while in the United States it went from 25% to 26%. A foreseeable contraction of international trade will further weaken the European economy.

Europe has abandoned its main assets to control inflation, so that local agricultural or industrial production for consumption in Europe has been replaced by Asia or Africa. Europeans have been able to maintain their purchasing power but have been undermining their future year after year. Regulations have done the rest, discouraging agricultural and industrial production in Europe.

The history of Europe in the last eighty years has been complex. It had to emerge from the post-World War II period by losing its main economic asset, which were its colonies, and thanks to an exceptional generation and the help of the United States it was able to build an industry in northern Europe that attracted millions of Europeans from the south. When the model was finally settling, the enlargement to Eastern Europe came. Suddenly, more than one hundred million Europeans became part of the broad range of European social rights, and we have had to do this by abandoning public investments to maintain the protection scheme. In short, we have lost valuable decades in undertaking social and economic changes that neither the United States nor China had to face, and this largely explains Europe's growing irrelevance

Ultimately, the world economy will witness a race to the death for critical materials associated with the digital revolution and the fight against climate change. China extracts 25% of the world's copper, 60% of the graphite and 70% of the rare earths, while it processes 75% of the cobalt, 70% of the lithium, 100% of the graphite and 90% of the rare earths. A restriction on the export of these products from China would further deepen the recession in Europe and provoke an escalation in tensions with the United States.

The competitiveness of the United States has grown by 15.5% in the last 20 years, by 11.8% in Germany, by 8.8% in the United Kingdom, but has fallen by 7.3% in Spain and by 5.1% in Italy. To understand the loss of wealth in Europe, it is enough to look at the map. The poorest state in the United States, Mississippi, has a GDP per capita of 51,300 dollars, while France with 47,000 dollars, Spain with 34,000 dollars, Italy with 40,000 dollars and the United Kingdom with 51,000 dollars are below. We produce more but with more people and less product per person, which means that we do not grow in factors of greater added value. The most paradigmatic case is Spain, whose employed population has grown by 27.35% in the last ten years, its GDP by 5% in real terms and its GDP per capita by 4.5%.

In short, Europe does not present itself as the most attractive place to grow your business. Until there is a structural regression, European economies will continue to slow down for all the reasons stated above. A radical revolution in the economy requires a renewal of the economic structure.

The European Union is now providing many benefits that are no longer sustainable. Its reduction could negatively affect cohesion among European countries and, consequently, Europe's greatest asset, the single market. If this collapses, and this is the aim of the two great powers, the recession will turn into decline, and this will put an end to the Europe we have known. Only a catharsis such as the one Argentina has had to endure could convince the Europeans to make a revolution, otherwise, in a few generations, Europe will be a theme park, full of old people and in economic decline.

THE EUROPEAN LAND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND THE RUSSIAN THREAT (II)

 

To understand the current state of the sector and where it will move in the coming years, we must analyze what results the weapons systems sent to Ukraine have given. MRLS systems like Himars, air defense systems such as the Patriot and the wide range of European missiles and UAVs, have been the differentiating elements. However, the outdated combat vehicles have hardly been effective, not producing the desired effect, the reason is that only new technologies set the course for this war as for all others. The tanks that were going to represent a qualitative change last summer, today no longer exist, they are broken down or preserved for a few operations.

    The three parameters of combat success in history remain the same: mobility, firepower and protection, the point is that in the face of changing threats, these three elements must be updated quickly to be effective.

    If we talk about battle tanks we have two opposite experiences. The tremendous Russian losses in Ukraine from drone attacks, close-range rocket launchers and improvised devices. Russia has lost more than four thousand combat vehicles, while in the same threat environment, Israel has not lost any Merkava in Gaza. The difference is undoubtedly the Trophy Active Protection System. Nowadays, the difference between having an effective tank or a target with little ability to avoid a direct attack and very vulnerable is active protection, like the Israeli Rafael, the German ADS or the Russian Arena, all of them with significant limitations when its defensive ammunition runs out. On the other side, they add very valuable additional protection. Hence, a good part of countries has embarked on processes of acquiring new cars with these systems, such as the new Leopard 2A8. For this same reason, the EuroTrophy GmbH consortium has been established among KDNS, GDELS and Rafael Advance Defense Systems, to Europeanize a critical solution for all combat vehicles.

    Seven countries have acquired or are going to acquire this expensive version, worth close to thirty million each; three times more than our Leopard 2E. The new tanks incorporate 55-caliber cannons, even Rheinmetall is working on a 130 mm cannon, but this will be joined by remote stations, greater armor on the top and anti-drone drone swarm systems. Spain should consider modernizing our cars with these types of solutions to keep them at the forefront of the state of the art. In Europe, Italy has abandoned the manufacture of its Ariete and will opt for the Leopard 2A8, while France and Germany are thinking about a tank of the future, which leaves the Leclerc as a car in need of a profound modernization and the same goes for the Challenger. 2 British.

    Battle tanks pose great limitations due to their weight, which is already around 70 tons, together with the fact that their effective fire range is still very short, requiring them to get closer to the target, which makes them vulnerable. Tracked combat vehicles have almost all the advantages of tanks, but weigh about 20 tons less, which allows them to be transported and deployed more quickly. They also have a lower signature, which increases their capacity in the battlefield. 

    Currently, the European track vehicle market is led by the ASCOD from General Dynamics and the Puma from KDNS Germany and Rheinmetall, while others such as the CV-90, the Dardo, or the Marder have been left behind by not incorporating more innovative solutions. The Polish Borsuk, derived from the Korean K-9, is also very far from the previous ones in terms of performance.

    GDELS presented at the recent arms fair in Romania, the ASCOD incorporating the Elbit Trophy system, which together with improvements that may include the armor to bring it to a level similar to tanks and a tower with a cannon of up to 120 mm, can offer very similar and more efficient capabilities than the battle tank.

    Finally in the field of combat vehicles on 8x8 wheels, the market is broader with AMV vehicles from Patria, Piraña III and V from GDELS Boxer from KDNS Germany, Centauro and Freccia from Iveco Oto Melara, Pandur from GDELS and VBCI from KDNS France. All of them, with weights greater than 30 tons, some of them exceeding 42 tons, offer capacities close to the previous ones, but in exchange they offer much more efficient transportation and mobility, equipping the same weapons systems as the previous ones.

    Today we can say that the mobility triad that all European armies must equip should include battle tanks with active protection systems, tracked vehicles with similar ones and 8x8 vehicles with a minimum level five of protection as in the case of the Romanian VBCI, to compensate for the absence of other additional protection systems.

    Taking into consideration that Russia in speeding up the pace of deliveries, Europe should´t allow this big gap it would be too dangerous.

    In recent years, the countries that have opted for new Leopard 2A8 tanks are: Germany (18 ordered + 105 option); Holland (18 ordered) Norway (54 ordered + 18 option) Lithuania (50 planned) Czech Republic (70 planned) besides these program I should add the modernization of 44 Danish tanks to version 2A7 that is in progress. The British Challenger 3 will incorporate the Trophy system. Only the Leclerc continues to put more emphasis on passive protection systems. It is to be hoped that at least the large Leopard user countries will orient themselves to the most modern versions and that those of the M-1 Abrams such as Poland can be equipped with the same solution.

    Among track vehicles, the main programs launched in recent years are: Denmark (44 CV90 from Bae Hagglunds); Norway ( 104 CV90, in 2009 and 144 CV90, in 2012) Sweden ( additional 50 CV90 in 2023), Czech Republic ( 230 CV90 in 2023) Slovakia (152 CV90 in 2022) Poland (1400 Bursuk planned) Germany ( Puma  additional 50 in 2023) United Kingdom (589 ASCOD in 2012) Spain (394 signed in 2024), Hungary (218 Lynx signed in 2020) and Greece (250 Lynx in 2023). Many of these acquisitions are continuations of previous orders.

    The countries that have already initiated preparatory actions for new vehicles of this class are Portugal to replace its 200 M-113s;  Estonia, which has already made a short list among Otokar, Hanwha and ASCOD for acquisition in 2028; and Romania, which has already launched a potential purchase of 246 vehicles plus an option of 52 for 2031 and in which the Lynx and ASCOD compete. Germany has acquired Automecanica, a truck manufacturer for local manufacturing while GDELS already has a company in production with the Piraña V. The presentation at the recent ASCOD Black Sea Aerospace & Defense in Bucharest with the Rafael Trophy, which also has a strong market position within the country places Spanish vehicle in a more favorable starting position.

    France and Italy should launch their replacement programs for the obsolete AMX-10 and Dardo, although these are undergoing a modernization that could extend their life by ten more years.

    Germany will have to address the continuity of the Puma for the next decade. It has developed the Lynx designed for the foreign market to which an active protection system could be incorporated such as the Hensoltd MUSS that the German Puma incorporates. It could be an option, but it does not seem that the vehicle currently meets the requirements of the Bunderwehr, so options for other vehicles such as the CV 90 and the ASCOD could find accommodation in a country that has been leading global armored vehicle manufacturing for almost a century. While countries that do not have modern vehicles of these characteristics, such as Belgium and Bulgaria, should consider acquiring this capacity.

    In the world of 8x8 wheeled vehicles (I exclude the 6x6, although there is now a tendency to recover their values and the Patria 6x6 platforms have been sold in several countries such as Sweden with 321 units recently) the most renewed platforms that are currently offered by the industry are the Piranha V from GDELS, the VBCI from KDNS France, the Boxer from KDNS Germany, the Freccia from Iveco Oto Melara, and the AMV from Patria. I left out the GD Co (USA) Stryker even though Bulgaria signed an FMS contract last year to acquire 183 Strykers.

    Among the most recent acquisitions are: Netherlands (38 Boxers planned for 2025); Italy (Freccia 30 in 2019, more acquisitions expected until the development of the new VCC platform is completed); Denmark (360 Piranha V in 2016); Romania (380 Piranha V between 2018 and subsequent extension) Poland (150 Rosomak-L, a longer version, in 2023, plus 150 vehicles sold to Ukraine in 2023, financed by American and European funds) Germany (Boxer 122 new order), United Kingdom (Boxer 523 in 2019) Spain (348 Piranha V local name Dragon in 2019 out of a total of 998 units in three series) Lithuania (88 Boxer in 2016). In general, all countries are updating their older versions, incorporating the recently implemented solutions in new acquisitions.

    Countries that will need to embark on wheel programs in the short term, are Greece and Norway which lack this capacity. Added to this is that both Germany and France will have to significantly increase their supply of combat vehicles since their current number seems very small for the size and relevance of their armies.

    The fourth key aspect will be the 155mm self-propelled artillery. There are still several countries that have US systems from the 70s such as the M109, as is the case of and Spain. The only operating platform of European design is the PZH 2000, although it is a rather old. Currently, wheeled platforms with the capacity to carry a 155/52 or 55 caliber howitzer will be the ones that will dominate this market in the next thirty years, since they are more versatile platforms, with less signal and weighing less than the PZH 2000. by about 15 tons, which is a very substantial difference. The new GDELS 10x10 platform with the KDNS Germany tower will allow, thanks to the distribution of the recoil over five axes, a very efficient shot in motion, which reduces its vulnerability and increases its effectiveness and will undoubtedly be a reference in the coming decades, both for howitzers and a platform for the Himars or the Puls. Taking into consideration the obsolete European fleet in main armies of M109 155mm or those coming from Soviet era of 152mm, as MRLS, the number of platforms should be replaced would be 691 ATP 155/152mm y 370 MRL systems.

    Conclusions

Europe has a great challenge ahead, very significantly increasing its units of state-of-the-art combat vehicles and artillery. However very important programs have been launched, as in Spain or Poland, the five major European armies need to increase their resources, and in an accelerated manner. The self-propelled artillery and MRLS programs are also essential, and the units in the process of incorporation are a tenth of the needs.

    Many may wonder if, given the weaknesses shown by Russian weapons and its industry, this rearmament process is necessary. There are two reasons that support this theory. Russia has preserved its combat aviation and air defense systems in Ukraine, even sacrificing a quick victory, and Russia has begun the production of its latest generation vehicles and although the rates are slow, they are already much faster than the European ones, which shows that this production is not designed for Ukraine.

    Europe needs to have a capacity to defeat Russia militarily, not just to stop it, and it is not a question of ambition or aggression, it is that only enormous conventional military superiority can counteract Russia's tactical nuclear capacity, if we are not willing to develop tactical nuclear weapons. The best way to defeat Russia and return it to the sphere of democracies and freedom is to defeat it industrially and technologically. When Russia knows that it cannot win, if it can destroy us but it will entail its self-destruction, it will be doomed to change its foreign and security policy, which is the ultimate objective, the peace and security of the continent and the world.

THE EUROPEAN LAND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND THE RUSSIAN THREAT (I)

 

A few days before the next Euro-Satory exhibition, the most important land weapons fair in Europe, it is timely, in the light of the war in Ukraine and the Russian threat, to analyze the state of our armies in terms of the dominance of land mobility in the event of a possible war with Russia and the industrial capacity to respond to this challenge.

    Paraphrasing some war theorist, we can affirm that battles are fought by infantry, they are won by logistics, but wars are won by industries. We could see it in Germany between 1939 and 1941, thanks to the German industrial effort that began in 1934 and in the case of the Allies from 1943 onwards thanks to the industrial impulse since 1939, especially in the United States.

    Since Putin took office, he has put enormous effort into modernizing his military industry, reorganizing its structure and initiating new generation weapons programs. Today we can indicate that these two processes, although they began about twenty years ago, were far from being completed when Russia decided to invade Ukraine. Moscow's calculation at the beginning of 2022 is that enormous military pressure on weak Ukraine would be enough for it to surrender, without the need to expose the limited modern equipment it had at that time. Endemic corruption and the shortage of talent in industries to tackle new programs have greatly delayed the launch and delivery times of new programs that are only in the prototype and testing phases, generating great doubts about their real potential.

    Between 1990 and 2015, Europe prepared militarily for operations abroad, far from its borders, and with little need for firepower and for low-intensity threats. The aeronautical and naval programs absorbed an enormous part of the budgetary resources, around 70% in European countries, thinking in neoclassic terms that dominance of the air and sea would be enough to conquer territory.

    European armies, in almost all cases, today have rolling stocks that have been in service for more than forty years. Only with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, concerns about the Russian threat began, which would materialize in an offensive action in February 2022 for the occupation of Ukrainian territory, in the purest sense of classic war. This change of scenario forced us to reconfigure all priorities and start new programs, starting with the Eastern European countries that felt the threat was closest. Even the most modern platforms such as Boxer, Centauro and VBCI have already accumulated about fifteen years of operation in their respective armies and require extensive modernization or replacement.

    In 1991, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe was signed. The aim was to reduce the number of platforms deployed in the theater of operations in Central and Northern Europe, to avoid an aggressive temptation on the Russian´s side. A maximum limit of 20,000 battle tanks and 30,000 combat vehicles was determined for each side. Today, all Europe has 3,000 battle tanks and 8,000 armored vehicles, far below the minimum-security level established when the great threat had disappeared. If we take into account the losses suffered by Russia in the Ukrainian War, some 2,000 tanks and 5,000 armored vehicles, in a minor conflict against a poorly prepared enemy, we will realize the first gap: our armies are not sufficiently equipped to deter Russia, and in the event of a war, to guarantee victory.

    Why does Russia, despite these losses, still have such an important military capacity? Why hasn't Europe been able to provide enough weapons to Ukraine in these two years? And finally, what is the status of the current and future programs and what must be modified in them to have a military capacity much superior to that of Moscow, the only way to guarantee peace and security against an enemy that has more of 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads?

    Russia is subject to a very restrictive embargo that has barely affected its military industry since China supplies it with numerous electronic equipment and materials essential to maintain the land industry. The income from oil sales to India with significant discounts, and the intermediation of companies from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Hong Kong, have allowed it to obtain the necessary foreign currency to finance imports and obtain critical dual-purpose material. But the most relevant thing is that Russia has submitted to a war economy. Dozens of automotive companies, hundreds of mechanizations and a huge amount of auxiliary industry have been militarized, hence the entire Russian economy is at the service of the war in Ukraine.

    It is true that during 2023, the Russian army received an average of 125 tanks per month when it was losing about sixty, to prepare for the 2024 offensive, but we must point out that 80% of these deliveries are modernized T-62 and T-55 tanks, although they continue to be tremendously vulnerable due to their gas emissions, size, poor armor, etc. Russia's strategic tank reserves estimated at about 5,000 tanks have been consumed by 50%. That is, Russia at this rate will not have the capacity to modernize more tanks by the end of the year. The same happens with combat vehicles, in which it produces twice as much as it loses, but also 70% are vehicles that are more than forty years old. The modernization focuses on communications, armor, optics and some of them have anti-drone protection, but if Ukraine resists a year at this rate of losses, Russia will be almost disarmed in the summer of 2025, hence the interest shown by Putin in a quick agreement.

The Uravalgonzavod factory, the world's largest manufacturer of combat tanks, has barely been able to deliver a hundred new Armata tanks or Terminator combat vehicles in these two years, due to the endemic problems of the Russian industry. It does not seem that this situation will change in the short term, so the failure of this Russian offensive would leave the occupying forces in a situation of extreme weakness. However, the production of 152 mm ammunition continues at an enormous pace, having multiplied by four in the last year, thanks to the concentration of ammunition manufacturing in large calibers. Furthermore, North Korea has militarized ammunition factories with almost slave labor and has already delivered one million 152 mm rounds. The Russian gap is about platforms but it does not seem that it will lose the war due to ammunition.

The production of computers, electronic and optical equipment increased by 40% in 2023, thanks to imports from China. Turkey was until February of this year when Biden signed an executive order with new restrictions on trading with Russia to 93 entities, 16 of them from Turkey, the largest after Russia, an important supplier of so-called «key equipment» for the military industry, which has caused serious restrictions from NATO.

China supplies CNC equipment, machine tools, semiconductors, chips, and numerous auxiliary equipment as well as raw materials, all essential to maintaining Russian industrial capacity. In fact, imports of sensitive material from China increased by 200% in 2023. North Korea has supplied more than a thousand containers of military material, 2.3 million 152 mm rounds and 400,000 122 mm rounds and dozens of tactical missiles used in Ukraine. At the beginning of the war, nineteen dark ships with military equipment arrived at the Russian port of Vostochni, from Korea. The West's fear is that the payment could be in nuclear and ballistic missile technology, which would seriously endanger global security.

There is one aspect that has been commented by experts in these two years of war, the absence of Russian combat aviation over Ukrainian airspace. The main reason is the tremendous delay in the development of fifth generation aircraft, SU-34, and the shortage of critical equipment for its development that had European origin. The underlying reason is that Russia wants to preserve its aviation intact in the event of a possible conflagration with another European country or with NATO. I mean, Russia keeps an operational fleet of about 2,000 combat aircraft and this is a factor to take into account to size the future threat.

Ukraine was a country with almost no army, with a military industry that had been decapitalized by the Russian embargo. European aid in these two years has also focused, as in the Russian case, on material in operation or close to retirement, although in recent months this trend has been reversed with direct purchases of new material for Ukraine that will be very relevant in the future.

The European land weapons industry was demobilized in 2020 with a supply chain greatly sized for the shortage of orders of the last twenty-five years. This demobilization has meant the inability to supply to Ukraine with sufficient ammunition, especially large caliber, essential for the development of this war. The biggest problem is not in the manufacturers but in the supply and raw materials chain that has been difficult to implement due to the large number of affected countries and the contraction in supply. Once again it is evident that the scarce self-sufficiency of European industry is its greatest handicap, with high dependence on third countries, many of them under Russian or Chinese influence.

REFUGIADOS: DRAMA, OPORTUNIDAD Y AMENAZA

Todo en la vida posee diferentes puntos de vista que tienen mucho que ver con los sentimientos de las personas o su situación económica; y la cuestión de los refugiados constituye sin duda un aspecto digno de estudio que nos hace cuestionar si nuestro mundo libre merece el nombre de civilizado, a la vista de algunas reacciones y comportamientos a los que hemos asistido en estos últimos años.

Asuntos Exteriores comienza este viernes en Libertad Digital TV con el que consideramos el acontecimiento más importante acontecido en Europa en los últimos años, tanto por la dimensión del fenómeno como por sus implicaciones políticas, con el auge de los nacionalismos, económicas, culturales y de seguridad. El drama de millones de personas llegando a nuestras fronteras, de miles de cadáveres en el Mediterráneo, de unos conflictos bélicos terribles a apenas unas pocas horas de avión de Madrid, constituye sin duda la madre de todas las grandes batallas que Europa deberá dar en los próximos años. De cómo se resuelva, dependerá el futuro de Europa y seguramente del mundo tal como lo conocemos.

Hemos convertido un drama gigantesco de cuyos orígenes no somos ajenos, en una amenaza para los europeos; es decir hemos dado la vuelta al problema para convertir esta tragedia en un atentado contra nuestro modo de vida. Existen miedos, fobias y razones para considerar esta oleada millonaria de refugiados del Medio Oriente y África como una amenaza a nuestro estado de bienestar y seguridad, pero haríamos mal si para comenzar este análisis nos desviáramos del verdadero problema: el drama de los refugiados.